Information Technology System Failure and Value of Airlines:  A Case Study of Airlines in 2016 by Gokhale, Jayendra
Publications 
10-2018 
Information Technology System Failure and Value of Airlines: A 
Case Study of Airlines in 2016 
Jayendra Gokhale 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, gokhalej@erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication 
 Part of the Aviation Commons, and the Finance Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Gokhale, J. (2018). Information Technology System Failure and Value of Airlines: A Case Study of Airlines 
in 2016. Journal of International Finance and Economics, 18(4). https://doi.org/10.18374/JIFE-18-4.9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
JIFE, Volume 18, Number 4, 2018   ISSN: 1555-6336
116 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM FAILURE AND VALUE OF AIRLINES: A CASE STUDY OF 
AIRLINES IN 2016 
Jayendra S. Gokhale, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, U.S.A. 
dx.doi.org/10.18374/JIFE-18-4.9 
ABSTRACT 
Technology is a critical component of a firm’s operations. Technology failures can cause 
widespread problems in airlines. These failures cause disruptions in flight schedules, 
cause passengers to be stranded at airports and also increase airline operating costs. 
The objective of this study is to measure an effect of information technology failures on 
the firm value of passenger airline companies during the year 2016. In that year, there 
were cases involving delays and cancellations associated with JetBlue, Southwest, Delta, 
American, and Virgin America that received significant media coverage. Using the event 
study methodology, this study finds that the intensity of failures does not seem to affect 
the firm value as much as the time taken to address it and the presence of other 
compounding effects. The system failure case provides us with an insight into the effect 
on market value of airlines especially when they address their issues quickly and 
efficiently. 
Keywords: Event Study, Airline Industry, Stock Returns 
1. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon to witness airline passengers facing delays during their travel. Sometimes the factors 
causing these delays are exogeneous such as weather or traffic-control issues etc. Under such situations, 
airlines’ liability is smaller and the effect on the airline firm value is relatively less significant. This is 
especially true if the event is short lived. On the other hand, if the event is caused due to reasons that are 
endogenous, such as maintenance errors or technology and system failures, investors may not be so 
forgiving. Endogenous reasons can cause inconvenience to passengers, create trouble with regulators 
and can damage the safety record and reputation of the company. On the other hand, diligent follow-up 
during adverse events can effectively work toward rebounding and turning around the reputation of such 
a company to end up enhancing it (Gokhale et al., 2014a). 
In the auto industry, fixes proposed by manufactures through recalls suggest a significant decline in 
sales, loss of reputation and firm value (as an illustration, see Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Kini, Shenoy 
and Subramaniam, 2013; Gokhale et al., 2014b and Gokhale and Raghavan, 2015). However, it may not 
be logical to compare a differentiated oligopoly such as the auto market with the more concentrated 
passenger airline sector, in which travelers may not have as many options to buy the product due to 
constraints on schedules, airports, corporate tie-ups and sunk costs from frequent flier relationships or 
credit card relationships. 
Delays in airlines frequently arise when weather is a problem. Situations in which there is ice on the 
runway may lead to disruptions in take-off and landing and leads to a chain reaction of delays and/ or 
cancellations of flights. Gokhale and Raghavan (2015) study the effect of weather delays on airline firm 
value and find that the loss of revenue that results from such delays/ cancellations reflects on the firm 
value only if the delays are sustained over relatively longer periods of time. Another reason that could 
lead to a loss of airline firm’s market value could be catastrophic events such as 9-11. However, as 
Guzhva (2008) and Carter and Simkins (2004) found, positive intervention by the Government can help 
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bring these firms back to profitability. The current study contributes to the existing literature by finding that 
in the case of information technology failure, rapid intervention by the airline itself can result in little or no 
loss of reputation.  
Information Technology and Airlines 
Information technology plays a key role in the smooth functioning of a firm. While any firm relies on its 
marketing skills to expand its business, its infrastructure consisting of fixed assets is equally important. A 
lack of support from infrastructure creates frictions in day-to-day operations and leads to several problems 
such as breakdown of schedules, delay in servicing of aircraft, negative externalities and customer 
dissatisfaction. The financial value of these disruptions can be measured by a reduction in future profits. 
Since the stock price of a company is equivalent to the expected discounted value of future cash flows, 
the stock price reflects this information assuming that the markets are efficient. However, any negative 
event is likely to adversely affect the expected future profits and causes a negative effect on the stock 
price. 
More recently, passenger traffic in the US airline industry has growing rapidly due to increasing load 
factors and improving business cycle. An advancement of Information Technology (IT) is also helping 
sustain this acceleration. Airlines have used IT systems for a wide range of operations which include 
computerized airline reservation system, flight operations, telecommunications, website, maintenance 
systems including servers and check-in kiosks. Most of the airlines have their own mobile applications 
available for the customer, which can be used for various purposes. 
Any failure in IT systems causes passengers to be stranded at airports for relatively longer periods of 
time. As airlines try and bring their operations back to normal, they have to compensate the affected 
passengers by giving vouchers for food and lodging. Historically, the airline industry has been a pioneer 
in introducing modern technology with computerized reservations in the 1960s. However, with the same 
computer systems built more than half a century ago, there is a need for constant updates (Mouawad, 
2010). This can occasionally cause failure in transmitting data to other parts of the system or to the 
passengers. Moreover, consolidation in the US airline industry has led to further complications. A merger 
of two airlines leads to integration of different systems, a process that can be both complex and time 
consuming. As an instance when Delta Airlines merged with Northwest Airlines in 2010, it took nearly two 
years to merge its technology and reservation systems. The former CIO of American Mr. Monte E. Ford 
who led the airline to its automation in the mid-2000s made the following observation on modernizing 
technology at airlines,  
“It’s like changing the engine of a plane in flight. But we firmly believe consumers will drive the 
technology, and we are trying to build an environment that will adapt to that.” 
Today’s passenger airlines need strong support from their information technology infrastructure to 
appropriately serve customers, connect with suppliers, perform airport operations and aid operating staff. 
The year 2016 witnessed a number of cases where this support was lost due to various reasons. In this 
paper there is an illustration of cases where there was technology disruption in Delta, Southwest, JetBlue 
and Sabre (an information system support provider). These events are studied in order to assess the 
impact of internal vs external causes of failure, the impact due to the magnitude of the failure in terms of 
the number of days during which the services were disrupted and also the number of flights that were 
cancelled due to the technology breakdown. 
Dehning et al. (2005) develop a “firm value framework” model to demonstrate the effect of adoption and 
updates of information technology on the economic value of a firm. In this research paper, the objective is 
to investigate the effect of failure in IT systems on the economic value of airlines. Using the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), an empirical assessment is also made in order to determine whether there is 
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statistical significance in the financial impact felt by airlines. We consider four major events of IT failure 
that affected the major airlines in 2016 in the United States. 
  
The first event is related to the data systems provided by Verizon to JetBlue. JetBlue relies completely on 
Verizon’s Data Center to provide data and backup for its reservation and scheduling system. There was a 
power outage at a data center on the morning of January 14, 2016 (Mutzabaugh, 2016). Customers faced 
trouble to access the JetBlue website and mobile app (Chernicoff, 2016). Moreover, there were problems 
with check in and printing of boarding passes (Pramuk, 2016). While reservations and airport check-in 
services were restored within a few hours, complete restoration of all services was not achieved until that 
night. Consequently, travelers reported long lines at JetBlue hubs. More than 200 flights were delayed 
and 4 flights were cancelled by the afternoon (Sverdlik, 2016). This represents roughly 25% of the 
airline’s daily traffic. 
 
In the second event, there was a failure of the switchgear assembly at Southwest airlines that occurred 
on July 20, 2016 (Preimesberger, 2016). However, “the way the router failed”, according to its CEO Mr. 
Gary Kelly, “the partial failure of the router meant that backup systems did not take over the broken-down 
processes in time” and this led to a cascade of multiple system failures (Shine, 2016b). Consequently, the 
airline had to cancel nearly 2,000 flights in five days. This is roughly equivalent to 11% of its peak total 
volume of flights (Shine, 2016a). In addition to the cancellations, more than 1,300 flights were delayed.  
The third event of IT failure occurred when the switch that provides power supply to the servers at Delta 
Airlines crashed on August 8, 2016. Although Delta responded swiftly, the delays and cancellations could 
not be avoided for two days (Kurtz, 2016). About 2000 flights were cancelled, which represented roughly 
20% its total flights per day and more than 1,932 flights were delayed. Mysteriously, the servers at Delta 
did not switch to the back up system at the time of outage, which is what led to the cascade effect of 
pressure on multiple systems (Isidore, 2016).  
 
The final event under study is the outage that occurred on October 17 of 2016 at Sabre. This company 
hosts information on ticketing and reservations of airlines on its servers (Schlangenstein, 2016). This 
company also provides real-time data services to websites like Expedia and Travelocity. Additionally, it 
also hosts reservation information for several hotels. The outage at Sabre prevented customers from 
booking flights. Sabre is widely used by many airlines. As a result of the outage, American, Southwest 
Airlines, JetBlue Airways and Virgin America reported problems in their reservation system. American 
reported delays in 200 flights and 11 cancellations (Koenig, 2016), whereas Southwest reported an effect 
on the bookings of its domestic flights. JetBlue reported problems in booking with its mobile application 
and Virgin reported problems when passengers were attempting online check-in. 
 
 
2. EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
The foundation of measuring the impact of the surprise created by a favorable/ adverse event is rooted in 
the measurement of financial information of a firm available from the stock markets. If  is the return 
from the stock of a company, then  can be measured using the stock price and dividends (if any) paid 
out by the company. This is correlated with the market returns by the following model 
 
   …(1) 
Or    …(2) 
 
Where  is the return from the stock of company ‘i' on day ‘t’ 
X is exogeneous information that determines the stock return  
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As a special case, we can assume that if there are no other drivers that cause fluctuations to the stock 
price of company ‘i', then the only factor causing a movement in the stock price is  the return from the 
overall stock market. 
 
 and  are respectively the intercept and the slope parameters of equation (1) 
 is random walk that is expected to follow a normal distribution. The normality assumption is 
asymptotically met because the number of observations in the data set are sufficiently large enough in 
this dataset. 
 
Equation (1) is called the market model and is based on the assumption that markets are perfectly 
efficient, implying that any new information about a company is reflected from its stock price. This 
methodology was introduced by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). It has 
been reviewed by MacKinlay (1997), Bhagat and Romano (2002a and 2002b) and by Corrado (2011). 
Keeping in mind the increased volatility of financial markets, Marshall et al. (2018) study the specification 
of event studies for intraday test statistics. Any shock due to new information about a company is 
transmitted instantaneously to its stock price (Brooks et al., 2003). The event study method has been 
extensively used to study the effect of favorable/ adverse shocks on the value of companies.  
  
Equation (1) is estimated in the empirical literature through ordinary least squares (See Jarrell and 
Peltzman (1985), Hoffer, Pruitt and Reiley (1998), Wood and Gokhale (2018), Gokhale et al. (2014) and 
Gokhale and Raghavan (2015)) under the assumption that any new information pertaining to the value of 
an asset is immediately factored into its price. In other words, this model assumes that the financial 
markets are efficient. If there is a shock that changes the information about a company ‘i', then the effect 
of this shock can be measured by error term. We call this abnormal return of the stock  , which is 
given by 
 
   …(3) 
 
And,  is obtained from the predicted value of  from the model estimated through equation (2). 
 
If the shock continues over a certain period of time say , then we can define cumulative abnormal 
returns  as 
 
   …(4) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) measure the sum total of the effect of the abnormal returns arising 
out of a given event over a period of “T” days. One can test the significance of   and  . The null 
hypothesis for the test is that   or   are not significantly different from zero implying that the 
event had no effect on the stock returns of the company, i.e. investors do not perceive that the event 
caused any damage to either the profitability or the reputation of the firm. 
  
When ARs and CARs are reported, it needs to be ascertained whether these are significant. On one 
hand, large abnormal return that is not significant does not mean anything for the firm value because it is 
not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, a small abnormal return that is significant also 
does not mean much. The only information that can be gleaned from such an abnormal return is that the 
event has a small but significant effect on the value of the firm. There are certain parametric and non-
parametric tests available, which help evaluate the significance of ARs and CARs. The parametric test 
involves finding the variance of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns and have been 
discussed in previous research. See Patell (1976), McWilliams and McWilliams (2000) & McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997). In addition to the parametric tests, there are non-parametric rank and sign tests to evaluate 
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the significance of ARs and CARs. See MacKinlay (1997), Corrado (1989, 2011), Corrado and Zivney 
(1992). 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
The dataset used for this study includes information on stock price of airlines Delta, Southwest, JetBlue, 
American and Virgin America and for information technology support companies Verizon and Sabre. 
Information on stock prices and returns was obtained from Yahoo! Finance. Returns are defined as the 
daily change in the stock price, including dividends if any. Table 1 below summarizes different event 
dates, estimation and event windows for each case of technology failure. Each estimation window covers 
a period of 1 year prior to the event. This includes 251 trading days for each event. The event window for 
each event covers a period of 11 trading days. Since all events occurred on the day stock markets were 
trading, stock price information for day zero could be affected by the event. Therefore, the event window 
for all four cases starts on day zero. However, it is significant to note that not all event windows start on 
day zero. Shocks such as earnings surprises that occur after the markets stop trading are typically 
covered with event windows that start on day 1.  
Table 2 below discusses the summary statistics of the four events. Stock specific returns for estimation 
window vary between -9% (Southwest, in the estimation window for event 2) and 8.8% (JetBlue in the 
estimation window for event 1). Market returns for estimation window vary between -4.1% (events 1, 2 
and 3) and 4% (events 2 and 3). In each event, neither returns from a stock nor the returns from overall 
markets were significantly different from zero at 10% significance during a means comparison test. 
Event Event Date Estimation 
Window 
dates 
Event 
Window 
dates 
Event 
Description 
Event 1 01/14/2016 1/15/15 to 
1/13/16 
(251 days) 
1/14/16 to 
1/29/16 
(11 days) 
There was a system failure at the Verizon 
data center which led to problems with online 
check-in and boarding of JetBlue flights. 
Event 2 07/20/2016 7/22/15 to 
7/19/16 
(251 days) 
7/20/16 to 
8/3/16 
(11 days) 
There was a system failure at Southwest 
airline which led to cancellation of over 2000 
flights and delay of another approximately 
1300 flights. 
Event 3 08/08/2016 8/10/15 to 
8/5/16 
(251 days) 
8/8/16 to 
8/22/2016 
(11 days) 
There was a system failure at Delta airlines, 
which led to a cancellation of 2300 flights 
and delay of approximately another 1900 
flights. 
Event 4 10/17/2016 10/19/15 to 
10/14/16 
(251 days) 
10/17/16 to 
10/31/2016
(11 days) 
There was a system failure at Sabre, which 
led to delay of 200 flights and cancellation of 
11 flights and a disruption in reservation 
system, online booking and online check-in. 
Table 1: Description of estimation and event windows for four events of technology failure in airlines in 
2016 at Verizon and JetBlue (Event 1), Southwest (Event 2), Delta (Event 3) and Sabre (Event 4) 
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Event  Variable Description N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Event 1: Tech. 
failure at 
JetBlue 
R1t returns from JetBlue stock 251 0.002 0.023 -0.079 0.088 
R2t returns from Verizon stock 251 -0.000 0.010 -0.030 0.038 
Rmt returns from S&P 500 251 -0.000 0.010 -0.041 0.038 
Event 2: Tech. 
failure at 
Southwest 
R1t returns from Southwest stock 251 0.001 0.019 -0.092 0.074 
Rmt returns from S&P 500 251 0.000 0.011 -0.041 0.040 
Event 3: Tech. 
failure at Delta 
R1t returns from Southwest stock 251 -0.001 0.021 -0.082 0.056 
Rmt returns from S&P 500 251 0.000 0.011 -0.041 0.040 
Event 4: Tech. 
failure at 
Sabre 
R1t returns from Southwest stock 251 0.000 0.020 -0.112 0.074 
R2t returns from JetBlue stock 251 -0.001 0.023 -0.091 0.080 
R3t returns from Virgin America  251 0.002 0.032 -0.065 0.417 
R4t returns from Sabre stock 251 -0.000 0.017 -0.083 0.075 
Rmt returns from S&P 500 251 0.000 0.009 -0.036 0.025 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the returns from each airline and market returns performed for each event 
which include the number of observations, the minimum, maximum, the standard deviation and the 
average of the returns for the period under study. 
 
The regression results for each stock in events 1, 2 and 3 are displayed in table 3 (a), while those for 
each stock in event 4 are shown in table 3 (b) below. In each case there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the stock returns and the market returns. From event 1, the coefficient for Verizon 
(0.74) is much less volatile than that for JetBlue (1.12). From event 2, although the coefficient of market 
return is close to 1, the parameter estimate for rmt in event 2 (Southwest) is not significantly different from 
1. However, the parameter estimate is significantly different from that of JetBlue (1.197) at 10% level of 
confidence. Furthermore, for event 3 (Delta) the parameter estimate (1.179) is significantly different from 
that obtained for rmt in both Events 1 and 2 at 5% level. This indicates that the relationship of the slope 
parameter for each airline with market returns is different from other airlines in different events. Overall, 
the returns of  Verizon (0.74, event 1) and Virgin America (0.60, event 4) were the least sensitive to 
market returns and those of American (1.46, event 4) and JetBlue (1.31 in event 4) were the most 
sensitive to market returns. The parameter estimate for was significant at 0.1% level for all the 
regression models under study indicating a highly significant correlation of these stocks with overall 
markets. 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Returns from 
Verizon 
Stock 
Returns from 
JetBlue 
Stock 
Returns from 
Southwest 
Stock 
Returns from 
Delta Stock 
 Intercept  0.000  0.002  0.001 -0.001 
(standard error) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
coefficient of rmt  0.739***  1.197***  0.983***  1.179*** 
(standard error) (0.043) (0.128) (0.092) (0.100) 
N 251 251 251 251 
R2 0.540 0.259 0.320 0.357 
Prob-F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05 
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Table 3a: Regression results for estimation period in events related to technology failure in airlines in 
2016 for event 1 (Verizon and Jetblue), Event 2 (Southwest) and Event 3 (Delta) 
Event 4 
Dependent 
Variable 
Returns from 
Sabre Stock 
Returns from 
JetBlue 
Stock 
Returns from 
Southwest 
stock 
Returns from 
American 
stock 
Returns from 
Virgin 
America 
stock 
 Intercept -0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.001  0.002 
(standard error) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
coefficient of rmt  1.031***  1.309***  1.235***  1.458***  0.603*** 
(standard error) (0.098) (0.137) (0.118) (0.135) (0.221) 
N 251 251 251 251 251 
R2 0.310 0.268 0.307 0.320 0.029 
Prob-F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05 
Table 3b: Regression results for estimation period in events related to technology failure in airlines in 
2016 for event 4 (Sabre, JetBlue, American and Virgin America) 
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for each stock in each event are as shown in table 4 
at the end of this paper. To check whether cumulative abnormal returns drop after each event, these are 
plotted against time for each event in figures 1 through 4 at the end. In the first event, when there was a 
system failure at Verizon that led to problems with check-in and boarding at JetBlue, the abnormal returns 
of JetBlue were negative only on day 2 but not statistically significant (at 10%). CARs for the company 
were not negative from days zero through 8 (table 4, panel 1). On January 28, 2016 (day 9), JetBlue 
reported its results for the fourth quarter of 2015. Although its revenues and profits exceeded investor 
expectations, volatility in fuel prices  and slower outlook for tourism related revenues caused negative and 
significant abnormal returns on that day as seen in Figure 1 (Zacks equity research, 2016). Similarly, 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns from Verizon stock are not statistically significant on 
the event day, indicating no effect on the company’s value as perceived by the investors (Figure 1) from 
technology failure. In fact, according to CNN Money, investors kept pouring into the Verizon stock and 
other high dividend stocks such as utilities due to weakness of overall stock markets and rotation into 
income stocks (La Monica, 2016). This explains why CAR for Verizon stock reached positive 10.9% by 
day 8 and was significant at 1%. 
In the second event of system failure at Southwest airlines, the company saw its abnormal returns dip by 
2.1% on day zero and by another 10.9% on day 1. The effects on day 1 were compounded by Southwest 
reporting its earnings for second quarter of 2016 (Figure 2). According to its press release, although the 
company booked record profits, they missed investor expectations. Even as the company claimed it had 
fixed the problem, delays and cancellations kept mounting and its cumulative abnormal returns went 
down to 18.1% by August 2, 2016 (day 9). According to the CEO Mr. Gary Kelly, this event was 
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expensive and the company was worried about the financial impact. However the top management was 
even more worried about its brand reputation and inconvenience caused to customers (Jansen, 2016). 
According to the company’s press release when it reported its results for third quarter of 2016, it lost $ 55 
million of revenues approx. and $ 24 million in additional expenses related to the failure. The Southwest 
case demonstrates that if technical issues do not get resolved quickly, investors tend to feel more 
nervous about the stock. 
In the third event at Delta Airlines, abnormal returns were negative for the first three days. However, 
these were not significant at 10% (Table 4, panel 3). Even by day 4, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
reached negative 3.2% (Figure 3). The company scrambled to address the issue and restore its 
operations within three days. Unlike southwest, there were no confounding effects for Delta. Also since 
Delta’s operations are larger and the impact was slightly less on that airline as compared to Southwest. 
This explains why the airline stock did not witness as negative and significant cumulative abnormal 
returns as other airlines. However, CNN Money reported the loss due to this five-hour disruption to the 
airline was $ 150 million (Isidore, 2016, Ostrower, 2016 and the press release reporting results for third 
quarter 2016 for the company). 
In the fourth event, the systems operated by Sabre Corporation failed, resulting in delays to flights 
operated by almost all major airlines except United and Delta. Consequently, the shares of Sabre 
suffered negative abnormal returns for days 1, 2 and 3, with those on day 3 being significant at 10% 
(Figure 4(a)). However, none of the affected airlines showed abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns that were significant at levels as high as 10% (Table 4 panel 4 and figure 4(b)). On the other 
hand, Sabre did witness a dip in its CARs up to negative 3.1% on day 3. AR for that day was negative 
and significant at 10%.  
This demonstrates that investors viewed technology failure as a significant event from the perspective of 
the provider of technology, i.e. Sabre Corp., but considered it as an exogeneous event from the airlines’ 
perspective, similar to the JetBlue case in event 1. Therefore the affected airlines did not witness a 
financial market impact from this event, even though there was operational difficulty. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recently, all major airlines have faced problems due to failure in technology. The current study chooses 
the calendar year 2016 as a sample to evaluate and demonstrate the effects of technology failure on firm 
value of affected airlines and IT service providers. The main inference is that when technology failure 
causes delays or cancellations of flights, even when the technical issue is widespread across the  airline’s 
operations such as crew scheduling, flight scheduling, passenger back-up and reservation spillovers, if 
the problem is addressed swiftly, the drop in market value of the affected airline is neither sharp nor 
statistically significant as seen in the case of JetBlue (event 1), Delta (event 3), American (event 4), 
Southwest (event 4), JetBlue (event 4) and Virgin America (event 4). However, if the problem drags on 
and/ or gets compounded with other issues such as negative earnings surprise, perfect information 
transmission through the financial markets tends to demonstrate an evidence for more negative and 
statistically significant abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns.  
Gokhale and Raghavan (2015) find a similar evidence in case of airlines affected by weather delays. The 
future scope of this work could be to find the threshold for such a drop in firms’ market value. However, 
this can be limited by use of data from over different periods of time in which investor behavior may 
change significantly, thereby making such comparisons harder. 
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Panel 1 
Day Ar1t CAR1t AR2t CAR2t 
0 
 0.013 
(0.657) 
 0.013 
(0.513) 
 0.004 
(0.613) 
 0.004 
(0.479) 
1 
 0.024 
(1.195) 
 0.038* 
(1.389) 
 0.006 
(0.888) 
 0.010 
(1.126) 
2 
 -0.024 
(-1.190) 
 0.014 
(0.399) 
 0.009* 
(1.312) 
 0.019** 
(1.666) 
3 
 0.042** 
(2.053) 
0.055* 
(1.487) 
  0.000 
(-0.073) 
 0.019* 
(1.496) 
4 
 -0.009 
(-0.440) 
 0.047 
(1.065) 
 0.029*** 
(4.173) 
 0.047*** 
(3.216) 
5 
 0.007 
(0.335) 
 0.053 
(1.032) 
 0.010* 
(1.506) 
 0.058*** 
(3.312) 
6 
 0.019 
(0.940) 
 0.072* 
(1.357) 
 0.011* 
(1.605) 
 0.069*** 
(3.817) 
7 
 -0.018 
(-0.866) 
 0.055 
(0.926) 
 0.016** 
(2.317) 
 0.085*** 
(4.236) 
8 
 -0.004 
(-0.197) 
 0.051 
(0.829) 
 0.024*** 
(3.542) 
 0.109*** 
(5.261) 
9 
  -0.071*** 
(-3.480) 
 -0.020 
(-0.301) 
 -0.004 
(-0.615) 
 0.105*** 
(4.738) 
10 
 0.039** 
(1.894) 
 0.019 
(0.267) 
 0.002 
(0.232) 
 0.106*** 
(4.397) 
(***: p < 0.01, **: p < 0.05, *: p < 0.1) 
Table 4 Abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for company ‘i' at time ‘t’ for events 1, 2, 3 and 4 with significances, standard error in parenthesis 
Panel 1: Event 1 – Companies JetBlue (‘i' = 1) and Verizon (‘i' = 2) 
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Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AR1t CAR1t AR1t CAR1t 
0 
 -0.021* 
(-1.336) 
 -0.021 
(-1.252) 
 -0.005 
(-0.262) 
 -0.005 
(-0.265) 
1 
 -0.109*** 
(-6.925) 
 -0.130*** 
(-5.815) 
 -0.008 
(-0.440) 
 -0.012 
(-0.495) 
2 
 0.008 
(0.529) 
 -0.122*** 
(-4.332) 
 -0.014 
(-0.828) 
 -0.026 
(-0.892) 
3 
 -0.011 
(-0.674) 
 -0.133*** 
(-4.142) 
 0.001 
(0.084) 
 -0.025 
(-0.712) 
4 
 0.023* 
(1.478) 
 -0.109*** 
(-3.048) 
 -0.008 
(-0.443) 
 -0.032 
(-0.834) 
5 
 -0.021* 
(-1.314) 
 -0.130*** 
(-3.319) 
 0.013 
(0.766) 
 -0.019 
(-0.449) 
6 
 -0.002 
(-0.144) 
 -0.132*** 
(-3.114) 
 0.008 
(0.437) 
 -0.012 
(-0.257) 
7 
 -0.015 
(-0.934) 
 -0.147*** 
(-3.223) 
 0.014 
(0.821) 
 0.002 
(0.047) 
8 
 0.001 
(0.048) 
 -0.146*** 
(-3.024) 
 -0.013 
(-0.784) 
 -0.011 
(-0.212) 
9 
 -0.035** 
(-2.222) 
 -0.181*** 
(-3.590) 
 -0.005 
(-0.319) 
 -0.017 
(-0.300) 
10 
 0.006 
(0.369) 
 -0.175*** 
(-3.291) 
 -0.003 
(-0.198) 
 -0.020 
(-0.344) 
(***: p < 0.01, **: p < 0.05, *: p < 0.1) 
Table 4 Abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for company ‘i' at time ‘t’ for events 1, 2, 3 and 4 with significances, standard error in parenthesis 
Panel 2: Event 2 – Southwest Airlines (‘i’ = 1) 
Panel 3: Event 3 – Delta Airlines (‘i’ = 1) 
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 Panel 4 – Part 1 
day AR1t CAR1t AR2t CAR2t AR3t CAR3t 
0 
 0.004 
(0.298) 
 0.004 
(0.328) 
 0.002 
(0.140) 
 0.002 
(0.154) 
 0.002 
(0.095) 
 0.002 
(0.104) 
1 
 -0.008 
(-0.557) 
 -0.004 
(-0.177) 
 0.003 
(0.174) 
 0.005 
(0.215) 
 -0.006 
(-0.326) 
 -0.005 
(-0.158) 
2 
 -0.007 
(-0.484) 
 -0.010 
(-0.410) 
 0.010 
(0.617) 
 0.016 
(0.514) 
 0.024 
(1.203) 
 0.019 
(0.536) 
3 
 -0.021* 
(-1.475) 
 -0.031 
(-1.080) 
 0.003 
(0.193) 
 0.019 
(0.547) 
 0.023 
(1.193) 
 0.042 
(1.053) 
4 
 0.015 
(1.109) 
 -0.015 
(-0.483) 
 0.003 
(0.163) 
 0.022 
(0.560) 
 -0.001 
(-0.050) 
 0.042 
(0.920) 
5 
 -0.005 
(-0.328) 
 -0.020 
(-0.563) 
 -0.008 
(-0.452) 
 0.014 
(0.327) 
 0.005 
(0.273) 
 0.047 
(0.935) 
6 
 0.006 
(0.429) 
 -0.014 
(-0.371) 
 -0.005 
(-0.287) 
 0.009 
(0.202) 
 -0.031* 
(-1.561) 
 0.016 
(0.304) 
7 
 -0.009 
(-0.643) 
 -0.023 
(-0.571) 
 -0.082*** 
(-4.879) 
 -0.073* 
(-1.497) 
 -0.025 
(-1.269) 
 -0.009 
(-0.153) 
8 
 0.004 
(0.267) 
 -0.019 
(-0.454) 
 0.025* 
(1.495) 
 -0.048 
(-0.930) 
 -0.006 
(-0.311) 
 -0.015 
(-0.247) 
9 
 0.010 
(0.682) 
 -0.010 
(-0.220) 
 0.002 
(0.126) 
 -0.046 
(-0.847) 
 -0.001 
(-0.033) 
 -0.015 
(-0.246) 
10 
 0.007 
(0.485) 
 -0.003 
(-0.065) 
 0.022* 
(1.316) 
 -0.023 
(-0.414) 
 0.014 
(0.709) 
 -0.002 
(-0.023) 
(***: P < 0.01, **: p < 0.05, *: p < 0.1) 
Table 4 (continued) Abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for company ‘i' at time ‘t’ for events 1, 2, 3 and 4 with significances, standard error in parenthesis 
Panel 4 : Event 4 – Part 1 - Companies Sabre (‘i'=1), Southwest (‘i'=2), Jetblue (‘i'=3) 
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Panel 4 – part 2 
Day AR4t CAR4t AR5t CAR5t 
0 
 0.004 
(0.197) 
 0.004 
(0.217) 
 0.034 
(1.070) 
 0.034 
(1.175) 
1 
 0.011 
(0.590) 
 0.015 
(0.538) 
 -0.001 
(-0.040) 
 0.033 
(0.704) 
2 
 0.029* 
(1.515) 
 0.044 
(1.269) 
 -0.003 
(-0.089) 
 0.030 
(0.519) 
3 
 0.002 
(0.119) 
 0.047 
(1.178) 
 0.003 
(0.085) 
 0.033 
(0.500) 
4 
 -0.017 
(-0.889) 
 0.030 
(0.667) 
 0.010 
(0.330) 
 0.043 
(0.591) 
5 
 -0.007 
(-0.384) 
 0.022 
(0.450) 
 -0.003 
(-0.091) 
 0.040 
(0.496) 
6 
 0.002 
(0.100) 
 0.024 
(0.459) 
 0.005 
(0.168) 
 0.045 
(0.527) 
7 
 -0.006 
(-0.303) 
 0.018 
(0.327) 
 -0.015 
(-0.484) 
 0.030 
(0.329) 
8 
 0.019 
(1.009) 
 0.038 
(0.641) 
 -0.004 
(-0.132) 
 0.026 
(0.268) 
9 
 0.009 
(0.447) 
 0.046 
(0.751) 
 0.001 
(0.018) 
 0.027 
(0.262) 
10 
 0.014 
(0.725) 
 0.060 
(0.930) 
 -0.005 
(-0.155) 
 0.022 
(0.203) 
(***: P < 0.01, **: p < 0.05, *: p < 0.1) 
Table 4 (continued) Abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal returns (CARs) 
for company ‘i' at time ‘t’ for events 1, 2, 3 and 4 with significances, standard error in parenthesis 
Panel 4 : Event 4 – Part 2 - Companies American (‘i'=4) and Virgin America (‘i'=5) 
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Event 1 
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Event 2 
Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Event 3 
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Figure 4 (a): Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Event 4 
Figure 4 (b): Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Event 4
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